# 1AC

## Changes

### Hardt and Negri

#### This stance of solidarity with the multitude is necessary to move beyond the antimodern politics of the status quo – oppositional politics reinforces the dyad between established power and revolution.

Michael Hardt, and Antonio Negri, 2011 (Michael Hardt is a Professor of Literature and Italian at Duke University. Antonio Negri is an independent researcher and writer. He has been a Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Paris and a Professor of Political Science at the University of Padua., “common wealth”, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press :)

Up to this point we have explored antimodernity as a form of resistance internal to modernity in at least three senses. First, it is not an effort to preserve the premodern or unmodern from the expanding forces of modernity but rather a struggle for freedom within the power relation of modernity. Second, antimodernity is not geographically external to but rather coextensive with modernity. European territory cannot be identified with modernity and the colonial world with antimodernity. And just as the subordinated parts of the world are equally modern, so too antimodernity runs throughout the history of the dominant world, in slave rebellions, peasant revolts, proletarian resistances, and all liberation movements. Finally, antimodernity is not temporally external to modernity in the sense that it does not simply come after the exertion of modern power, a reaction. In fact antimodernity is prior in the sense that the power relation of modernity can be exercised only over free subjects who express that freedom through resistance to hierarchy and domination. Modernity has to react to contain those forces of liberation. At this point, however, especially after having recognized the savage, excessive, monstrous character of liberation struggles, we run into the limits of the concept and practices of antimodernity. In effect, just as modernity can never extricate itself from the relationship with antimodernity, so too antimodernity is finally bound up with modernity. This is also a general limitation of the concept and practices of resistance: they risk getting stuck in an oppositional stance. We need to be able to move from resistance to alternative and recognize how liberation movements can achieve autonomy and break free of the power relation of modernity. A terminological cue from the globalization protest movements shows us a way out of this dilemma. When large demonstrations began to appear regularly at the meetings of leaders of the global system across North America and Europe in the late 1990s and the first years of the new millennium, the media were quick to label them “antiglobalization.” Participants in these movements were uncomfortable with the term because, although they challenge the current form of globalization, the vast majority of them do not oppose globalization as such. In fact their proposals focus on alternative political process – and the movements themselves constructed global networks. The name they proposed for themselves, then, rather than “antiglobalization,” was :”alterglobalization” (or altermondialiste, as is common in France.) The terminological shift suggests a diagonal line that escapes the confining play of opposites – globalization and antiglobalization – and shifts the emphasis from resistance to alternative. A Similar terminological move allows us to displace the terrain of discussions about modernity and antimodernity. Altermodernity has a diagonal relationship with modernity. It marks conflict with modernity’s hierarchies as much as does antimodernity but orients the forces of resistance more clearly toward and autonomous terrain. We should note right away, though, that the term alterrmodernity can create misunderstandings. For some the term might imply a reformist process of adapting modernity to the new global condition while rpeserving its primary characteristics. For others it might suggest alternative forms of modernity, especially as they are defined geographically and culturally, that is, a Chinese modernity, a European modernity, an Iranian modernity, and so forth. We intend for the term “altermodernity” instead to indicate a decisive break with modernity and the power relation that defines it since altermodernity in our conception emerges from the traditions of antimodernity – but it also departs from antimodernity since it extends beyond opposition and resistance. Frantz Fanon’s proposition of the stages of evolution of “the colonized intellectual” provides an initial guide for how to move from modernity and antimodernity to altermodernity. In Fanon’s first stage the colonized intellectual assimilates as much as possible to European culture and thought, believing that everything modern and good and right originates in Europe, thus devaluing the colonial past and its present culture. Such an assimilated intellectual becomes more modern and more European than the Europeans, save for the dark skin color. A few courageous colonized intellectuals, however, achieve a second stage and rebel against the Eurocentrism of thought and the coloniality of power. “In order to secure his salvation,” Fanon explains, “in order to escape the supremacy of white culture the colonized intellectual feels the need to return to his unknown roots and lose himself, come what may, among his barbaric people.”61 It is easy to recognize too a whole series of parallel forms that antimodern intellectuals take in the dominant countries, seeking to escape and challenge the institutionalized hierarchies of modernity along lines of race, gender, class, or sexuality and affirm the tradition and identity of the subordinated as foundation and compass. Fanon recognizes the nobility of this antimodern intellectual position but also warns of its pitfalls, in much the same way that he cautions against the dangers of national consciousness, negritude, and pan-Africanism. The risk is that affirming identity and tradition, whether dedicated to past suffering or past glories, creates a static position, even in its opposition to modernity’s domination. The intellectual has to avoid getting stuck in antimodernity and pass through it to a third stage. “Seeking to stick to tradition or reviving neglected traditions is not only going against history, but against one’s people,” Fanon continues. “When a people support an armed or even political struggle against a merciless colonialism, tradition changes meaning.”62 And neither does identity remain fixed, but rather it must be transformed into a revolutionary becoming. The ultimate result of the revolutionary process for Fanon must be the creation of a new humanity, which moves beyond the static opposition between modernity and antimodernity and emerges as a dynamic, creative process. The passage from antimodernity to altermodernity is defined not by opposition but by rupture and transformation.

# 2AC

## Wilderson

### AT: Wilderson

#### This ability allows us to move past traditional leftist movements that have failed and create new political spaces for change – their alternative necessarily creates a static identity that fails

Manuel Callahan, Professor of Race relations at Humboldt State University, 2005, “Why not share a dream? Zapatismo as Political and Cultural Practice,” http://www.jstor.org/stable/23263123

While we should not abandon the responsibilities and challenges of sincere solidarity work, taking our cues from the EZLN, we might suggest that Zapatismo invites people to become part of "the struggle" in their own manner, at their own pace, and without being measured by any specific model of "conscientization" or a political program specified by "the organization." However, the effort at encuentro challenges us to interrogate the limitations and contradictions of more traditional solidarity activism. Zapatismo reveals the political tensions of building a movement based only on single issue campaigns, on behalf of a specific constituency, and relying on short-lived fragile coalitions often over-determined by the most immediate crisis. In many cases those solidarity efforts that fail to escape a liberal mold can unwittingly promote possessive individualism, celebrating a single leader, often considered the best and the brightest of the group, who is expected to state the group's issues, history, strategies and goals. The result is a single model, plan, or program dominated by an elite. Consequently, a narrowly defined solidarity effort can easily reproduce paternalism and hierarchy within the organization and between the organization and the constituency being "served." Echoing Holloway's warning in this volume, traditional solidarity projects fall into the trap of defining, representing, and speaking for the struggle(s) of others, while at the same moment insisting on "the progress" of those being aided, making solidarity efforts resistant to modifications and slow to adapt to shifting contexts. Solidarity projects that represent, define and speak for the struggle (s) of others presuppose the progress of those being aided and not the transformation of those pro viding the aid. Moreover, aide workers operating in a narrow solidarity mode are less likely to acknowledge or celebrate the transformations that have already taken place in "targeted" com munities, inadvertently facilitating an insidious imperialism. Professional well-funded NGOs, for example, "can become shadow bureaucracies parallel to Southern nation state administrations."30 Ultimately, a bureaucratic model of social change will not be able to prioritize and promote the transformation of those pro viding the aid. Although there may be valid concerns we must interrogate regarding the challenges of "solidarity," the political practice examined here does not seek to impose a rigidly defined alternative practice. The Zapatistas have been consistent in keeping with what they have argued is the task of an armed movement: to "present the problem, and then step aside."31 As critical catalysts in posing problems they have deliberately not posed solutions on other groups or spaces. "But it is already known that our specialty is not in solving problems, but in creating them. 'Creating them?' No, that is too presumptuous, rather in proposing. Yes, our specialty is proposing problems."32 The Zapatista provocation insists that rights emerge from collective identities and communal needs expressing collectively articulated obligations and not the competing interests of individual need.33 Rather than emphasize networks as our only organizing objective, we might also imagine the movement in solidarity with the Zapatistas as an imagined community, a collective effort to define obligations that are rooted in a locally placed culture generating knowledge about what works across generations. The very act of provocation undertaken has been a bridge manifest in a new international, not an international based on rigid party doctrines or dogmas of competing organizations but "an international of hope." The new international is defined by dignity, "that nation without nationality, that rain bow that is also a bridge, that murmur of the heart no matter what blood lives it, that rebel irreverence that mocks borders, customs and wars."34 "Instead of a new bureaucratic apparatus, for the world coordination of a political movement expressing universal ideals and proposals," Esteva explains, "the International of Hope was created: a web constituted by innumerable differentiated autonomies, without a center or hierarchies, within which the most varied coalitions of discontents can express themselves, to dismantle forces and regimes oppressing all of them."35 The process of creating political space for dialogue between a diverse number of constituencies occupying a particular space suggests that community is neither homogenous nor static. Rather than speak of "the community," Zapatismo strives for a notion of community embodying a multiplicity of histories, experiences, resources, and obligations. The pursuit of new political relationships underscores the need to re-discover strategies to collectively define obligations of and within a community through dialogue based on respect. Political projects and proposals need to emerge organically—not imposed either by an individual (caciquismo) or a cabal (protagonismo). As the Frente Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (FZLN) have warned, people organizing themselves must begin "with the situation in which they find themselves, not in the one which we might desire to be found."36 In new political spaces all voices, all proposals must be responded to with respect. Democracy, as Marcos suggests, is a gesture "to decide upon the dominant social proposal." Liberty implies the freedom necessary to pursue one action over another, the expression of desire for the fulfillment of hope and dignity. Free from oppression, fear or persecution liberty sustains diversity and the choice, "to subscribe to one or another proposal."37 "It is," writes Marcos, "the same desire: democracy, liberty, and justice. In the heroic delirium of the Mexican southeast, hope implies a name: Tachicam, the unity of long ing for a better future."

#### Singularity disad – they paper over the ways oppression constitutes itself in different ways than just the oppression of the black body – dooms their movement to failure

Simon Tormey, Head of the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Sydney, 2006, ‘Not in my Name’: Deleuze, Zapatismo and the Critique of Representation”

Thinking more generally about the socio-political ideology of Zapatismo, what becomes evident is the reluctance to commit themselves to a ‘vision’ or blueprint of how the world should be transformed, or indeed how even the Chiapas should be transformed. This again is a source of irritation for otherwise sympathetic onlookers who would like to see in the Zapatistas the vanguard of an attempt to construct a viable ‘counter- empire’ of the kind influentially discussed by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in their controversial work Empire. Surely it is asked, there must be some notion of what the world should look like in order to mobilise people against the world as it is now? Again, the notion that ‘resistance against’ can only make sense when seen as the antonym of a ‘resistance for’, in this case in favour of a distinct political system or space is one that is challenged both implicitly and explicitly by Zapatista practice. As Marcos insists: Zapatismo is not an ideology, it is not bought and paid for by a doctrine. It is … an intuition. Something so open and flexible that it really occurs in all places. Zapatismo poses the question: ‘What is it that excluded me?’‘What is that has isolated me?’ In each place the response is different. Zapatismo simply states the question and stipulates that the response is plural, that the response is inclusive … 29 In attempting to elaborate what Zapatismo is, communiqués articulate the idea of ‘a political force’ that operates in negation to that which is, as opposed to the embodiment of something that has yet to be created. In this sense they directly eschew the idea of a government or system ‘in waiting’ as per the classic ‘putschist’ rhetoric of traditional revolutionary movements. As has often been noted, they have yet to articulate a response to the ‘land question’, which is the very issue that caused the Zapatistas to come into being in the first place. Zapatismo is ‘silent’ on this and all the other matters that have animated left radicals over the past two centuries, that have nurtured them in the ‘hard times’, and helped to maintain their faith that history is on their side. But the ‘silence’ is surely telling in positive ways. As we noted at the outset, this is a political force that prefers not to ‘speak’, but rather to ‘listen’ and provide what Marcos terms an ‘echo’ of what it ‘hears’. As Marcos notes, this would be: An echo that recognises the existence of the other and does not overpower or attempt to silence it. An echo that takes its place and speaks its own voice, yet speaks with the voice of the other. An echo that reproduces its own sound, yet opens itself to the sound of the other. An echo […] transforming itself and renewing itself in other voices. An echo that turns itself into many voices, into a network of voices that, before Power’s deafness, opts to speak to itself, knowing itself to be one and many, acknowledging itself to be equal in its desire to listen and be listened to, to recognising itself as diverse in the tones and levels of voices forming it.30 To Marcos this is a different kind of political practice. It is one that insists that there are no a priori truths that can be handed down to ‘The People’; there is no doctrine that has to be learned or spelled out; there is only ‘lived experience’. Zapatismo is a political force that is concerned with the means by which people can be ‘present’ as opposed to being represented, whether it be by political parties, ideologies, or the other familiar devices and strategies that have prevented voices being heard. To quote Marcos, what they are struggling for is a world in which ‘all worlds are possible’. Similarly In The Second Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle, Marcos declares (on behalf of the Zapatistas) that: ‘we aren’t proposing a new world, but something preceding a new world; an antechamber looking into the new Mexico. In this sense, this revolution will not end in a new class, faction of a class, or group in power. It will end in a free and democratic space for political struggle’.30 Their struggle is one to permit other conceptions of the world to come into being. Of course this is punctuated by a view of what it is that such spaces require: the obliteration of party machines, of the bloated and antique structures of representation that clog Mexico’s political system; but the point is such strictures are regarded as the basis upon which a genuine political process can take place. What is left out is any ‘final’ account of justice, equality or democracy. Contrast Zapatismo in other words, with traditional revolutionary rhetoric and more particularly with the communist struggles of the past with their tightly knit, disciplined hierarchies built on a thorough going utilitarianism that is prepared, as Trotsky once bluntly put it, ‘to break eggs to make an omelette’. In Zapatismo we find on the contrary a sentiment that insists that all the ‘eggs’ are of value. It is ‘dignity’ and ‘respect’ for the singular voice that animates this struggle against representation, not a desire to fulfil the historical or foreordained destiny to which all voices are or will be subject. In this sense as in the other senses discussed here, it seems to me that this is a very Deleuzian kind of struggle, and Deleuze (and Guattari) anticipate on the plane of high theory the kinds of demands being articulated by Marcos and the Zapatistas. This is also to say that the search for a post-representational form of political practice should not be read as necessarily ‘nihilistic’ (as Laclau insists) or as one that inevitably pits the aristocratic ‘one’ against the many. Or if it is, then it is a nihilism that, as per Deleuze’s reading of ‘eternal return’, isa struggle in which being and difference are constantly affirmed. It is an affirmation of difference itself, of the singular voice, and of the possibility of and necessity for ‘spaces’ in which those voices can be heard. In the terms offered by Deleuze and Guattari this would be ‘smooth’ space as opposed to the ‘striated’ space of representational systems. It would be a ‘deterritorialised’ space of combination and recombination in accordance with differentiated, disaggregated desires; not the territorialised space of hierarchy, fixed and known roles that define ‘identity’. In terms of Zapatismo, this is a space in which ‘all worlds are possible’and in which it is the constant combination and recombination of the indigenous peoples that determines what ‘happens’.

#### Empirics prove – singular movements are doomed to failure – only Zapatismo solves

David Solnit, writer and activist organizer who helped take a part in the 1999 WTO Shutdowns, 2003, “Globalize Liberation: How to Uproot the System and Build a Better World,” Text

The new radicalism is a movement of movements, a network of networks, not merely intent on changing the world, but—as the Zapatistas describe—making a new one in which many worlds will fit. It is a patchwork quilt of hope sewn together with countless hands, actions, songs, e-mails, and dreams into a whole that is much greater than the sum of its pieces. These movements, with their new ways of organizing, resistance, communication and new forms of alternative institutions, represent a dramatic departure from the last century’s prevailing strategies of working for change. A common theme within the new radicalism is the practice of letting the means determine the ends. Unless the community or world we want is built into and reflected by the struggle to achieve it, movements will always be disappointed in their efforts. Groups, political parties, or movements that are hierarchically structured themselves cannot change the antidemocratic and hierarchical structures of government, corporations, and corporate capitalism. Many of the twentieth-century’s major efforts – reforming existing institutions or governments in order to make them kinder and gentler, or overthrowing them and then occupying and replicating those same or similar structures of power – were ultimately not successful, and in the worst cases they left a legacy of disaster and betrayal for those who gave their sweat and blood in the fight for a better world. The term “Left,” has sadly lumped authoritarian groups, parties, governments, and dictators together with genuinely democratic social movements, and the “Left” and “Right” are no longer adequate to describe the complex political spectrum of the twenty-first century. Unless positive new ideas and methods are more clearly articulated and widely explored, people and movements striving for a better world will remain trapped in the failed models of the past. Without a creative break from these patterns we doom ourselves to stagnant movements, another generation of dishearted radicals, and a world unchanged. It is desperately clear that we need to articulate new ways of making change. The new radicalism has been birthed from this desire to popularize and self-organize mass movements form the ground up using these new ways. It’s time to throw out the old mythology that a single organization, ideology, or network can effectively change the world. The era of monolithic movements and international political parties is over. “Correct” political lines, one-ideology-fits-all, rigid blueprints, and cookie-cutter solutions won’t work. Instead, the new radicalism finds its hopeful possibilities in the diverse interconnected movements of movements that has risen up around the planet. These movements are distinct in each culture, community and place, and this diversity is at the heart of the new radicalism’s strength and appeal. This movement of movements represents the evolution of a new model of unity and expanded definitions of solidarity. This is the unity of acting in concert, finding points of convergence, making alliances and building networks, and networks of networks, that articulate a “NO” to the system, louder and more effectively than the sums of all our individual “NO’s.” The new radicalism has emerged organically as the impacted peoples of the world have listened to and connected with each other’s experience. Out of this instinct has come mutual respect and a common understanding of the interlocking systems that keep us all down in different ways. This is the healthy biodiviersity of an ecosystem of resistance.

#### Perm solves – Zapatismo can link up with other struggles effectively

Jeffery Popke, East Carolina University Professor, 06-xx-04, “The face of the other: Zapatismo,

responsibility and the ethics of deconstruction,” <http://myweb.ecu.edu/popkee/social%20and%20cultural.pdf>

Although it is undoubtedly important to assess, and support, the reform process in the domain of ‘political realism’, I want to focus my attention here on the messianic tenor of Zapatista discourse, on what Huntington (2000) has called their ‘politics of poetic resistance’ (see also Evans 1999; Higgins 2000). I do so because the discursive intervention of Zapatismo represents, in its aims, strategies and composition, a challenge to modern ethical ideals in a manner consistent with what I have argued thus far: ﬁrst, they articulate a form of ethical subjectivity that transcends both cultural difference and borders; and second, they argue for an alternative conception of politics, in which the future is open to construction in the absence of certainty. This ethical discourse is important in part because it has produced effects that resonate far beyond the immediate context of southern Mexico. The Zapatistas are ‘awakening, moving and stimulating the creative imagination of many others, who are already involved in similar concerns and struggles but often found themselves at a dead end’ (Esteva and Prakash 1998: 36). In this sense, I believe that the writings of Marcos and the EZLN are more than simply interventions in a regional struggle over indigenous rights and autonomy. They also both reﬂect and contribute to, through their broader engagement with global civil society, the development of a new conception of social and cultural agency, within which a different form of ethics and politics is at stake (Couch 2001; Stahler-Sholk 2001).

#### **The paragraph after you read concludes aff – says that affirming Zapatismo allows us to move past this desire for solidarity and create revolutionary potential**

El Kilombo Intergaláctico, 07 “BEYOND RESISTANCE: EVERYTHING,” <http://libcom.org/files/beyondresistance.pdf>

For us, Zapatismo was (and continues to be) unique exactly because it has provided us with the elements to shatter this tired schema. It has inspired in us the ability, and impressed upon us the necessity, of always viewing ourselves as digniﬁed political subjects with desires, needs, and projects worthy of struggle. With the publication of The Sixth Declaration of the Lacandón Jungle in June of 2005, the Zapatistas have made it even clearer that we must move beyond appeals to this stunted form of solidarity, and they present us with a far more difﬁcult challenge: that wherever in the world we may be located, we must become “companer@s” (neither followers nor leaders) in a truly global struggle to change the world. As a direct response to this call, this analysis is our attempt to read Zapatismo as providing us with the rough draft of a manual for contemporary political action that eventually must be written by us all.

#### Their operation within a black-white paradigm of race relations can never be truly liberatory because it marginalizes bodies that do not fit neatly into either category – from the Tainos and Chinese to the mulattas and mestizos.

Juan F. Perea, 10-31-1997, Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law, “The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The Normal Science of American Racial Thought,” http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1605&context=californialawreview

Hacker's omission of non-Black minority groups in his discussion of specific topics similarly suggests that these groups' experiences do not exist. Chapter nine, on segregated schooling, describes only the experience of Black segregation. This chapter makes no reference to the extensive history of segregation in education suffered by Latinos/as.39 Chapter ten asks, "What's Best for Black Children?" with no commensurate concern for other children. Similarly, Chapter eleven, on crime, discusses only perceptions of Black criminality and their interpretation. In discussing police brutality, Hacker describes only White police brutality against Blacks. There is not a single word about the similar police brutality suffered by Latino/a people at the hands of White police officers.' Nor are there any words in these chapters describing the experiences of Native Americans or Asian Americans. The greatest danger in Hacker's vision is its suggestion that non-White groups other than Blacks are not really subject to racism. Hacker seems to adopt the deservedly criticized ethnicity theory," which posits that non-White immigrant ethnics are essentially Whites-in-waiting who will be permitted to assimilate and become White.42 This is illustrated best in Chapter eight, "On Education: Ethnicity and Achievement," which offers the book's only significant discussion of non-White groups other than Blacks. Hacker describes Asians in "model minority" terms, because of high standardized test scores as a group. 3 He portrays Latinos/as as below standard, because of low test scores and graduation rates, and as aspiring immigrants. 4 Describing Asian Americans, Latinos/as and other immigrant groups, Hacker writes: Members of all these "intermediate groups" have been allowed to put a visible distance between themselves and black Americans. Put most simply, none of the presumptions of inferiority associated with Africa and slavery are imposed on these other ethnicities4 While a full rebuttal of this proposition is beyond the scope of this Article, its inaccuracy can be quickly demonstrated. Consider, for instance, the observations of historian David Weber, who described early Anglo perceptions of Mexican people: "American visitors to the Mexican frontier were nearly unanimous in commenting on the dark skin of Mexican mestizos who, it was generally agreed, had inherited the worst qualities of Spaniards and Indians to produce a 'race' still more despicable than that of either parent. '46 Rufus B. Sage expressed the common view of Mexicans in 1846: There are no people on the continent of America, whether civilized or uncivilized, with one or two exceptions, more miserable in condition or despicable in morals than the mongrel race inhabiting New Mexico.... To manage them successfully, they must needs be held in continual restraint, and kept in their place by force, if necessary,-else they will become haughty and insolent. As servants, they are excellent, when properly trained, but are worse than useless if left to themselves.47 More briefly, the common perception of Mexican Americans was that "They are an inferior race, that is all. 48 Incredibly, and without any supporting evidence, Hacker writes that "[m]ost Central and South Americans can claim a strong European heritage, which eases their absorption into the 'white' middle class."'49 Hacker continues, "[w]hile immigrants from Colombia and Cyprus may have to work their way up the social ladder, they are still allowed as valid a claim to being 'white' as persons of Puritan or Pilgrim stock."5 Hacker's comments are simply incredible for their blithe lack of awareness of how racism burdens the lives of Latino/a, Asian American and other racialized immigrant groups. While some Latinos/as may look White and may act Anglo (the phenomenon of passing for White is not limited to Blacks), Hacker's statement is certainly false for millions of Latinos/as. Current anti-immigrant initiatives targeted at Latinos/as and Asians, such as California's Proposition 1875' and similar federal legislation targeting legal and illegal immigrants,52 California's Proposition 209,53 and unprecedented proposals to deny birthright citizenship to the United States-born children of undocumented persons, debunk any notion that the White majority tolerates easily the presence of Latino/a or Asian people.' Ultimately, Hacker seems determined to adhere to the binary paradigm of race and to ignore the complexity introduced by other nonWhite groups, because it is convenient-which, it will be recalled, is a principal danger of paradigms. In the statistical section of the book, Hacker explains some of the problems with statistics he reproduces: Some government publications place persons of Hispanic origin within the black and white racial groupings. Others put them in a separate category, to differentiate them from blacks and whites. Wherever the sources permit, Two Nations has separated out Hispanics, to keep the book's emphasis on race as coherent as possible. Where this has not been possible, readers should bear in mind that the figures for whites may be inflated by the inclusion of considerable numbers of Hispanics.55 Although government publications have confused the ability to count Latinos/as,56 what is startling here is Hacker's vision that coherence in discussion of race requires emphasis on only Black and White. In other words, "real" race is only Black or White. Other groups only render this framework "incoherent." This is why the Black/White paradigm of race must be expanded: it causes writers like Hacker to ignore other non-White Americans, which in turn encourages others to ignore us as well.

#### Wilderson’s totalizing account of blackness is flawed and overly US centric

Dr. Saer Maty Ba, Professor of Film – University of Portsmouth and Co-Editor, 2011, “The US Decentred: From Black Social Death to Cultural Transformation”, Cultural Studies Review, 17(2), September

<http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/csrj/article/viewFile/2304/2474>

A few pages into Red, White and Black, I feared that it would just be a matter of time before Wilderson’s black‐as‐social‐death idea and multiple attacks on issues and scholars he disagrees with run (him) into (theoretical) trouble. This happens in chapter two, ‘The Narcissistic Slave’, where he critiques black film theorists and books. For example, Wilderson declares that Gladstone Yearwood’s Black Film as Signifying Practice (2000) ‘betrays a kind of conceptual anxiety with respect to the historical object of study— ... it clings, anxiously, to the film‐as‐text‐as‐legitimateobject of Black cinema.’ (62) He then quotes from Yearwood’s book to highlight ‘just how vague the aesthetic foundation of Yearwood’s attempt to construct a canon can be’. (63) And yet Wilderson’s highlighting is problematic because it overlooks the ‘Diaspora’ or ‘African Diaspora’, a key component in Yearwood’s thesis that, crucially, neither navel‐gazes (that is, at the US or black America) nor pretends to properly engage with black film. Furthermore, Wilderson separates the different waves of black film theory and approaches them, only, in terms of how a most recent one might challenge its precedent. Again, his approach is problematic because it does not mention or emphasise the inter‐connectivity of/in black film theory. As a case in point, Wilderson does not link Tommy Lott’s mobilisation of Third Cinema for black film theory to Yearwood’s idea of African Diaspora. (64) Additionally, of course, Wilderson seems unaware that Third Cinema itself has been fundamentally questioned since Lott’s 1990s’ theory of black film was formulated. Yet another consequence of ignoring the African Diaspora is that it exposes Wilderson’s corpus of films as unable to carry the weight of the transnational argument he attempts to advance. Here, beyond the US‐centricity or ‘social and political specificity of [his] filmography’, (95) I am talking about Wilderson’s choice of films. For example, Antwone Fisher (dir. Denzel Washington, 2002) is attacked unfairly for failing to acknowledge ‘a grid of captivity across spatial dimensions of the Black “body”, the Black “home”, and the Black “community”’ (111) while films like Alan and Albert Hughes’s Menace II Society (1993), overlooked, do acknowledge the same grid and, additionally, problematise Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP) policing. The above examples expose the fact of Wilderson’s dubious and questionable conclusions on black film.

#### Their argument elevates white supremacy to an all-pervasive force—this conceptual expansion hides the actual practice of racism and makes breaking it down more difficult

Andersen 3 – Margaret L. Andersen, Professor of Sociology and Women's Studies and Vice Provost for Academic Affairs at the University of Delaware, 2003, “Whitewashing Race: A Critical Perspective on Whiteness,” in White Out: The Continuing Significance of Racism, ed Doane & Bonilla-Silva, p. 28

Conceptually, one of the major problems in the whiteness literature is the reification of whiteness as a concept, as an experience, and as an identity. This practice not only leads to conceptual obfuscation but also impedes the possibility for empirical analysis. In this literature, "whiteness" comes to mean just about everything associated with racial domination. As such, whiteness becomes a slippery and elusive concept. Whiteness is presented as any or all of the following: identity, self-understanding, social practices, group beliefs, ideology, and a system of domination. As one critic writes, "If historical actors are said to have behaved the way they did mainly because they were white, then there's little room left for more nuanced analysis of their motives and meanings" (Stowe 1996:77). And Alastair Bonnett points out that whiteness "emerges from this critique as an omnipresent and all-powerful historical force. Whiteness is seen to be responsible for the failure of socialism to develop in America, for racism, for the impoverishment of humanity. With the 'blame' comes a new kind of centering: Whiteness, and White people, are turned into the key agents of historical change, the shapers of contemporary America" (1996b:153). Despite noting that there is differentiation among whites and warning against using whiteness as a monolithic category, most of the literature still proceeds to do so, revealing a reductionist tendency. Even claiming to show its multiple forms, most writers essentialize and reify whiteness as something that directs most of Western history (Gallagher 2000). Hence while trying to "deconstruct” whiteness and see the ubiquitousness of whiteness, the literature at the same time reasserts and reinstates it (Stowe 1996:77). For example, Michael Eric Dyson suggests that whiteness is identity, ideology, and institution (Dyson, quoted in Chennault 1998:300). But if it is all these things, it becomes an analytically useless concept. Christine Clark and James O'Donnell write: "to reference it reifies it, to refrain from referencing it obscures the persistent, pervasive, and seemingly permanent reality of racism" (1999:2). Empirical investigation requires being able to identify and measure a concept— or at the very least to have a clear definition—but since whiteness has come to mean just about everything, it ends up meaning hardly anything.

#### The alt is a snake eating its own tail – ontologically opposing Blackness to Whiteness makes Black struggle STRUCTURALLY dependent on the existence of White Racism and wounded attachments to suffering.

Pinn 2004 (Anthony, Anthony B. Pinn is an American professor and writer whose work focuses on liberation theology, Black religion, and Black humanism. Pinn is the Agnes Cullen Arnold Professor of Humanities and Professor of Religious Studies at Rice University, “‘‘Black Is, Black Ain’t’’: Victor Anderson, African American Theological Thought, and Identity,” Dialog: A Journal of Theology, Volume 43, Number 1 . Spring 2004

This connection between ontological blackness and religion is natural because: ‘‘ontological blackness signifies the totality of black existence, a binding together of black life and experience. In its root, religio, religion denotes tying together, fastening behind, and binding together. Ontological blackness renders black life and experience a totality.’’13 According to Anderson, Black theological discussions are entangled in ontological blackness. And accordingly, discussions of black life revolve around a theological understanding of Black experience limited to suffering and survival in a racist system. The goal of this theology is to find the ‘‘meaning of black faith’’ in the merger of black cultural consciousness, icons of genius, and post-World War II Black defiance. An admirable goal to be sure, but here is the rub: Black theologians speak, according to Anderson, in opposition to ontological whiteness when they are actually dependent upon whiteness for the legitimacy of their agenda. Furthermore, ontological blackness’s strong ties to suffering and survival result in blackness being dependent on suffering, and as a result social transformation brings into question what it means to be black and religious. Liberative outcomes ultimately force an identity crisis, a crisis of legitimation and utility. In Anderson’s words: Talk about liberation becomes hard to justify where freedom appears as nothing more than defiant self-assertion of a revolutionary racial consciousness that requires for its legitimacy the opposition of white racism. Where there exists no possibility of transcending the blackness that whiteness created, African American theologies of liberation must be seen not only as crisis theologies; they remain theologies in a crisis of legitimation.14 This conversation becomes more ‘‘refined’’ as new cultural resources are unpacked and various religious alternatives acknowledged. Yet the bottom line remains racialization of issues and agendas, life and love. Falsehood is perpetuated through the ‘‘hermeneutic of return,’’ by which ontological blackness is the paradigm of Black existence and thereby sets the agenda of Black liberation within the ‘‘postrevolutionary context’’ of present day USA. One ever finds the traces of the Black aesthetic which pushes for a dwarfed understanding of Black life and a sacrifice of individuality for the sake of a unified Black ‘faith’. Yet differing experiences of racial oppression (the stuff of ontological blackness) combined with varying experiences of class, gender and sexual oppression call into question the value of their racialized formulations. Implicit in all of this is a crisis of faith, an unwillingness to address both the glory and guts of Black existence—nihilistic tendencies that, unless held in tension with claims of transcendence, have the potential to overwhelm and to suffocate. At the heart of this dilemma is friction between ontological blackness and ‘‘contemporary postmodern black life’’—issues, for example related to ‘‘selecting marriage partners, exercising freedom of movement, acting on gay and lesbian preferences, or choosing political parties.’’15 How does one foster balance while embracing difference as positive? Anderson looks to Nietzsche. European genius, complete with its heroic epic, met its match in the aesthetic categories of tragedy and the grotesque genius revived and espoused by Friedreich Nietzsche. The grotesque genius served as an effective counter-discourse by embracing both the ‘light’ and ‘dark’ aspects of life, and holding in tension oppositional sensations—pleasure and pain, freedom and oppression.16 Utilizing Nietzsche’s work, Anderson ask: ‘‘what should African American cultural and religious criticism look like when they are no longer romantic in inspiration and the cult of heroic genius is displaced by the grotesquery—full range of expression, actions, attitudes, behaviors everything found in African American life—of contemporary black expressive culture and public life?’’17 Applied to African Americans, the grotesque embodies the full range of African American life—all expressions, actions, attitudes, and behavior. With a hermeneutic of the grotesque as the foci, religio-cultural criticism is free from the totalizing nature of racial apologetics and the classical Black aesthetic. By extension, Black theology is able to address both issues of survival (Anderson sees their importance.) and the larger goal of cultural fulfillment, Anderson’s version of liberation. That is to say, placing ‘‘blackness’’ along side other indicators of identity allows African Americans to define themselves in a plethora of ways while maintaining their community status. This encourages African Americans to see themselves as they are— complex and diversified—no longer needing to surrender personal interests for the sake of monolithic collective status.

#### Black optimism is comparatively better – it allows for actual structural positive changes to the black body

**Moten 7** Fred, Professor of English and African American Studies, Duke University "black optimism/black operation", Chicago -- working text for "Black Op" Source: [PMLA](http://www.mlajournals.org/loi/pmla), Volume 123, Number 5, October 2008, pp. 1743–1747 (5)

http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&ved=0CDQQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Flucian.uchicago.edu%2Fblogs%2Fpoliticalfeeling%2Ffiles%2F2007%2F12%2Fmoten-black-optimism.doc&ei=1fE2UO65KuG8yAHpiIHYCg&usg=AFQjCNE8N66fQjQ7TP0PkJ0eYZDI6cNLvA&sig2=BUrcwC5Cfz5Ero2I14PBsg

My field is black studies. In that field, I’m trying to hoe the hard row of beautiful things. I try to study them and I also try to make them. Elizabeth Alexander says “look for color everywhere.” For me, color + beauty = blackness which is not but nothing other than who, and deeper still, where I am. This shell, this inhabitation, this space, this garment—that I carry with me on the various stages of my flight from the conditions of its making—is a zone of chromatic saturation troubling any ascription of impoverishment of any kind however much it is of, which is to say in emergence from, poverty (which is, in turn, to say in emergence from or as an aesthetics or a poetics of poverty). The highly cultivated nature of this situated volatility, this emergent poetics of the emergency, is the open secret that has been the preoccupation of black studies. But it must be said now—and I’ll do so by way of a cool kind of accident that has been afforded us by the danger and saving power that is power point—that there is a strain of black studies that strains against black studies and its object, the critique of western civilization, precisely insofar as it disavows its aim (blackness or the thinking of blackness, which must be understood in what some not so strange combination of Nahum Chandler and Martin Heidegger might call its paraontological distinction from black people). There was a moment in Rebecca’s presentation when the image of a black saxophonist (I think, but am not sure, that it was the great Chicago musician Fred Anderson) is given to us as a representative, or better yet a denizen (as opposed to citizen), of the “space of the imagination.” What’s cool here, and what is also precisely the kind of thing that makes practitioners of what might be called the new ~~black~~ studies really mad, is this racialization of the imagination which only comes fully into its own when it is seen in opposition, say, to that set of faces or folks who constituted what I know is just a part of Lauren’s tradition of Marxist historiographical critique. That racialization has a long history and begins to get codified in a certain Kantian discourse, one in which the imagination is understood to “produce nothing but nonsense,” a condition that requires that “its wings be severely clipped by the imagination.” What I’m interested in, but which I can only give a bare outline of, is a two-fold black operation—one in which Kant moves toward something like a thinking of the imagination as blackness that fully recognizes the irreducible desire for this formative and deformative, necessarily supplemental necessity; one in which black studies ends up being unable to avoid a certain sense of itself as a Kantian, which is to say anti-Kantian and ante-Kantian, endeavor. The new black studies, or to be more precise, the old-new black studies, since every iteration has had this ambivalence at its heart, can’t help but get pissed at the terrible irony of its irreducible Kantianness precisely because it works so justifiably hard at critiquing that racialization of the imagination and the racialized opposition of imagination (in its lawless, nonsense producing freedom) and critique that turns out to be the condition of possibility of the critical philosophical project. There is a voraciously instrumental anti-essentialism, **powered in an intense and terrible way by good intentions**, that is the intellectual platform from which **black studies’ disavowal of its object** and aim is launched, even when that disavowal comes in something which also thinks itself to be moving in the direction of that object and aim. I’m trying to move by way of a kind of resistance to that anti-essentialism, one that requires a paleonymic relation to blackness; I’m trying to own a certain dispossession, the underprivilege of being-sentenced to this gift of constantly escaping and to standing in for the fugitivity (to echo Natahaniel Mackey, Daphne Brooks and Michel Foucault) (of the imagination) that is an irreducible property of life, persisting in and against every disciplinary technique while constituting and instantiating not just the thought but that actuality of the outside that is what/where blackness is—as space or spacing of the imagination, as condition of possibility and constant troubling of critique. It’s annoying to perform what you oppose, but I just want you to know that I ain’t mad. I loved these presentations, partly because I think they loved me or at least my space, but mostly because they were beautiful. I love Kant, too, by the way, though he doesn’t love me, because I think he’s beautiful too and, as you know, a thing of beauty is a joy forever. But even though I’m not mad, I’m not disavowing that strain of black studies that strains against the weight or burden, the refrain, the strain of being-imaginative and not-being-critical that is called blackness and that black people have had to carry. Black Studies strains against a burden that, even when it is thought musically, is inseparable from constraint. But my optimism, **black optimism**, is bound up with what it is to claim blackness and the appositional, runaway black operations that have been thrust upon it. The burden, the constraint, is the aim, the paradoxically aleatory goal that animates escape in and the possibility of escape from. Here is one such black op—a specific, a capella instantiation of strain, of resistance to constraint and instrumentalization, of the propelling and constraining force of the refrain, that will allow me to get to a little something concerning the temporal paradox of, and the irruption of ecstatic temporality in, optimism, which is to say black optimism, which is to say blackness. I play this in appreciation for being in Chicago, which is everybody’s sweet home, everybody’s land of California, as Robert Johnson puts it. This is music from a Head Start program in Mississippi in the mid-sixties and as you all know Chicago is a city in Mississippi, Mississippi a (fugue) state of mind in Chicago. “Da Da Da Da,” The Child Development Group of Mississippi, Smithsonian Folkways Records, FW02690 1967 The temporal paradox of optimism—that it is, on the one hand, necessarily futurial so that optimism is an attitude we take towards that which is to come; but that it is, on the other hand, in its proper Leibnizian formulation, an assertion not only of the necessity but also of the rightness and the essential timelessness of the always already existing, resonates in this recording. It is infused with that same impetus that drives a certain movement, in Monadology, from the immutability of monads to that enveloping of the moral world in the natural world that Leibniz calls, in Augustinian echo/revision, “the City of God.” With respect to C. L. R. James and José (Muñoz), and a little respectful disrespect to Lee Edelman, these children are the voices of the future in the past, the voices of the future in our present. In this recording, this remainder, their fugitivity, remains, for me, in the intensity of their refrain, of their straining against constraint, cause for the optimism they perform. That optimism always lives, which is to say escapes, in the **assertion of a right to refuse**, which is, as Gayatri Spivak says, the first right: an instantiation of **a collective negative tendency** to differ, to resist the regulative powers that resistance, that differing, call into being. To think resistance as originary is to say, in a sense, that we have what we need, that we can get there from here, that there’s nothing wrong with us or even, in this regard, with here, even as it requires us still to think about why it is that difference calls the same, that resistance calls regulative power, into existence, thereby securing the vast, empty brutality that characterizes here and now. Nevertheless, however much I keep trouble in mind, and therefore, in the interest of making as much trouble as possible, I remain hopeful insofar as I will have been in this very collective negative tendency, this little school within and beneath school that we gather together to be. For a bunch of little whiles, this is our field (i.e., black studies), our commons or undercommons or underground or outskirts and it will remain so as long as it claims its **fugitive proximity to blackness**, which I will claim, with ridiculousness boldness, **is the condition of possibility of politics**.

#### Coalition building is uniquely necessary for the black body

Stephano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University and Fred Moten, Associate professor of African American studies and visual studies at the University of California, 2013, “The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & Black Study”

What we are calling policy is the new form command takes as command takes hold. It has been noted that with new uncertainties in how and where surplus value is generated, and how and where it will be generated next, economic mechanisms of compulsion have been replaced by directly political forms. Of course for the colonial subject this change is no change as Fanon understood; and as Nahum Chandler has pointed out, the problem of the color line is neither a matter of a new nor an old primitive accumulation. The problem is nothing other than the way the difference between labor and capital remains prior to its remainder and is made abundant or into abundance. Moreover what we are calling policy comes into view now not because management has failed in the workplace, where it proliferates as never before, but because economic management cannot win the battle that rages in the realm of social reproduction. Here management encounters forms of what we will call planning that resist its every effort to impose a compulsion of scarcity through seizing the means of social reproduction. In the undercommons of the social reproductive realm the means, which is to say the planners, are still part of the plan. And the plan is to invent the means in a common experiment launched from any kitchen, any back porch, any basement, any hall, any park bench, any improvised party, every night. This ongoing experiment with the informal, carried out by and on the means of social reproduction, as the to come of the forms of life, is what we mean by planning; planning in the undercommons is not an activity, Planning and Policy 75 not fishing or dancing or teaching or loving, but the ceaseless experiment with the futurial presence of the forms of life that make such activities possible. It is these means that were eventually stolen by, in having been willingly given up to, state socialism whose perversion of planning was a crime second only to the deployment of policy in today’s command economy. Of course, the old forms of command have never gone away. The carceral state is still in effect and strategic wars on drugs, youth, violence, and terrorism have even given way to logistic wars of drones and credit. But horrible as such state command remains, it now deputises and delegates its power to seemingly countless and utterly accountable and accounted for agents who perform contemporary internal versions of the knightriders and settlers of earlier state violence deputisations. Or rather, since nightriders and settlers never really went away, deputised for segregation, anti-communism, migration, and nuclear family heteropatriarchy in much of the Global North, what policy represents is a new weapon in the hands of these citizen-deputies. Stand your ground – because man was not born to run away, because his color won’t run, because again and again the settler must incant the disavowal and target the epidermalised trace of his own desire for refuge – is only the most notorious iteration of this renewed dispersal and deputisation of state violence, aimed into the fugitive, ambling neighbourhoods of the undercommons. Content neither with abandoning the realm of social reproduction nor conditioning it for the workplace, the two always related moves of the relative autonomy of the capitalist state, today capital wants in. It has glimpsed the value of social reproduction and wants control of the means, and no longer just by converting them into productivities within formal industrialisations of care, food, education, sex, etc. but by gaining access to and directly controlling the informal experiment with the social reproduction of life itself. To do this, it has to break up the ongoing plans of the undercommons. And here, with bitter irony, is where the hope West could still speak of in 1984, which has subsequently gone back underground, is conjured as an image whose fecklessness is also its monstrosity. What we talk about, in its survival, 76 The Undercommons as planning appears, in its waning, as hope, which has been deployed against us in ever more perverted and reduced form by the Clinton- Obama axis for much of the last twenty years. Planning is self-sufficiency at the social level, and it reproduces in its experiment not just what it needs, life, but what it wants, life in difference, in the play of the general antagonism. Planning starts from the solidity, the continuity, and the rest of this social self-sufficiency, though it does not end there in having placed all these complex motion. It begins, as this disruption of beginning, with what we might call a militant preservation. And these are its means. Policy deputises those willing to, those who come to want to, break up these means as a way of controlling them, as once it was necessary to de-skill a worker in a factory by breaking up his means of production. And it does this by diagnosing the planners. Policy says that those who plan have something wrong with them, something deeply – ontologically – wrong with them. This is the first thrust of policy as dispersed, deputised command. What’s wrong with them? They won’t change. They won’t embrace change. They’ve lost hope. So say the policy deputies. They need to be given hope. They need to see that change is the only option. By change what the policy deputies mean is contingency, risk, flexibility, and adaptability to the groundless ground of the hollow capitalist subject, in the realm of automatic subjection that is capital. Policy is thus arrayed in the exclusive and exclusionary uniform/ity of contingency as imposed consensus, which both denies and at the very same time seeks to destroy the ongoing plans, the fugitive initiations, the black operations, of the multitude.

#### Altermodernity is the only way to overcome modernity – antimodernity dooms us to being caught up in the power struggles that modernity desires

Michael Hardt, and Antonio Negri, 2011 (Michael Hardt is a Professor of Literature and Italian at Duke University. Antonio Negri is an independent researcher and writer. He has been a Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Paris and a Professor of Political Science at the University of Padua., “common wealth”, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press :)

Up to this point we have explored antimodernity as a form of resistance internal to modernity in at least three senses. First, it is not an effort to preserve the premodern or unmodern from the expanding forces of modernity but rather a struggle for freedom within the power relation of modernity. Second, antimodernity is not geographically external to but rather coextensive with modernity. European territory cannot be identified with modernity and the colonial world with antimodernity. And just as the subordinated parts of the world are equally modern, so too antimodernity runs throughout the history of the dominant world, in slave rebellions, peasant revolts, proletarian resistances, and all liberation movements. Finally, antimodernity is not temporally external to modernity in the sense that it does not simply come after the exertion of modern power, a reaction. In fact antimodernity is prior in the sense that the power relation of modernity can be exercised only over free subjects who express that freedom through resistance to hierarchy and domination. Modernity has to react to contain those forces of liberation. At this point, however, especially after having recognized the savage, excessive, monstrous character of liberation struggles, we run into the limits of the concept and practices of antimodernity. In effect, just as modernity can never extricate itself from the relationship with antimodernity, so too antimodernity is finally bound up with modernity. This is also a general limitation of the concept and practices of resistance: they risk getting stuck in an oppositional stance. We need to be able to move from resistance to alternative and recognize how liberation movements can achieve autonomy and break free of the power relation of modernity. A terminological cue from the globalization protest movements shows us a way out of this dilemma. When large demonstrations began to appear regularly at the meetings of leaders of the global system across North America and Europe in the late 1990s and the first years of the new millennium, the media were quick to label them “antiglobalization.” Participants in these movements were uncomfortable with the term because, although they challenge the current form of globalization, the vast majority of them do not oppose globalization as such. In fact their proposals focus on alternative political process – and the movements themselves constructed global networks. The name they proposed for themselves, then, rather than “antiglobalization,” was :”alterglobalization” (or altermondialiste, as is common in France.) The terminological shift suggests a diagonal line that escapes the confining play of opposites – globalization and antiglobalization – and shifts the emphasis from resistance to alternative. A Similar terminological move allows us to displace the terrain of discussions about modernity and antimodernity. Altermodernity has a diagonal relationship with modernity. It marks conflict with modernity’s hierarchies as much as does antimodernity but orients the forces of resistance more clearly toward and autonomous terrain. We should note right away, though, that the term alterrmodernity can create misunderstandings. For some the term might imply a reformist process of adapting modernity to the new global condition while rpeserving its primary characteristics. For others it might suggest alternative forms of modernity, especially as they are defined geographically and culturally, that is, a Chinese modernity, a European modernity, an Iranian modernity, and so forth. We intend for the term “altermodernity” instead to indicate a decisive break with modernity and the power relation that defines it since altermodernity in our conception emerges from the traditions of antimodernity – but it also departs from antimodernity since it extends beyond opposition and resistance. Frantz Fanon’s proposition of the stages of evolution of “the colonized intellectual” provides an initial guide for how to move from modernity and antimodernity to altermodernity. In Fanon’s first stage the colonized intellectual assimilates as much as possible to European culture and thought, believing that everything modern and good and right originates in Europe, thus devaluing the colonial past and its present culture. Such an assimilated intellectual becomes more modern and more European than the Europeans, save for the dark skin color. A few courageous colonized intellectuals, however, achieve a second stage and rebel against the Eurocentrism of thought and the coloniality of power. “In order to secure his salvation,” Fanon explains, “in order to escape the supremacy of white culture the colonized intellectual feels the need to return to his unknown roots and lose himself, come what may, among his barbaric people.”61 It is easy to recognize too a whole series of parallel forms that antimodern intellectuals take in the dominant countries, seeking to escape and challenge the institutionalized hierarchies of modernity along lines of race, gender, class, or sexuality and affirm the tradition and identity of the subordinated as foundation and compass. Fanon recognizes the nobility of this antimodern intellectual position but also warns of its pitfalls, in much the same way that he cautions against the dangers of national consciousness, negritude, and pan-Africanism. The risk is that affirming identity and tradition, whether dedicated to past suffering or past glories, creates a static position, even in its opposition to modernity’s domination. The intellectual has to avoid getting stuck in antimodernity and pass through it to a third stage. “Seeking to stick to tradition or reviving neglected traditions is not only going against history, but against one’s people,” Fanon continues. “When a people support an armed or even political struggle against a merciless colonialism, tradition changes meaning.”62 And neither does identity remain fixed, but rather it must be transformed into a revolutionary becoming. The ultimate result of the revolutionary process for Fanon must be the creation of a new humanity, which moves beyond the static opposition between modernity and antimodernity and emerges as a dynamic, creative process. The passage from antimodernity to altermodernity is defined not by opposition but by rupture and transformation.

#### Using a strategy of altermodernity allows us to focus on the alternatives to modernity, rather than simply resistance to modernity – this is essential overcome modernity

Michael Hardt, and Antonio Negri, 2011 (Michael Hardt is a Professor of Literature and Italian at Duke University. Antonio Negri is an independent researcher and writer. He has been a Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Paris and a Professor of Political Science at the University of Padua., “common wealth”, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press :)

Modernity is always two. Before we cast it in terms of reason, Enlightenment, the break with tradition, secularism, and so forth, modernity must be understood as a power relation: domination and resistance, sovereignty and struggles for liberation.1 This view runs counter to the standard narrative that modernity emerged from Europe to confront in the colonies the premodern, whether that be conceived as barbaric, religious, or primitive. “There is no modernity without coloniality,” claims Walter Mignolo, “because coloniality is constitutive of modernity.”2 It is constitutive insofar as it marks the hierarchy at modernity’s heart. Modernity, then, resides not solely in Europe or in the colonies but in the power relation that straddles the two.3 And therefore forces of antimodernity, such as resistances to colonial domination, are not outside modernity but rather entirely internal to it, that is, within the power relation. The fact that antimodernity is within modernity is at least part of what historians have in mind when they insist that European expansion in the Americas, Asia and Africa be conceived not as so many conquests but rather as colonial encounters. The notion of conquest does have the advantage of emphasizing the violence and brutality of European expansion, but it tends to cast the colonized as passive. Moreoever, it implies that either the previously existing civilization was wiped out and replaced by that of the colonizer, or that it was preserved intact as an outside to the colonial world. This traditional view portrays colonial Indian society, for example, as Ranajit Guha writes, “either as a replication of the liberal-bourgeois culture of nineteenth-century Britain or as the mere survival of an antecedent pre-capitalist culture.”4 Modernity lies between these two, in a manner of speaking – that is, in the hierarchy that links the dominant and the subordinated – and both sides are changed in the relation. The notion of encounter highlights the two-ness of the power relation and the processes of mixture and transformation that result from the struggle of domination and resistance. Working from the standpoint of colonial encounters, historians document two important facts: precolonial civilizations are in many cases very advanced, rich, complex, and sophisticated; and the contributions of the colonized to so-called modern civilizations are substantial and largely unacknowledged. This perspective effectively breaks down the common dichotomies between the traditional the modern, the savage and the civilized. More important for our argument, the encounters of modernity reveal constant processes of mutual transformation. Long before the Spanish arrive in central Mexico, for example, the Nahua (that is, the inhabitants of the Aztec realm who speak Nahuatl) constructed highly developed cities, called altepetl, roughly the size of Mediterranean city-states. An altepetl is organized according to a cellular or modular logic in which the various parts of the metropolis correspond to an orderly cyclical rotation of labor duties and payments to the sovereign. After Cuauhtémoc surrenders to Cortés in 1521, the altepetl is not simply replaced by European urban forms through the long process of Hispanization, but neither does it survive intact. All the early Spanish settlements and administrative forms – the encomienda, the rural parishes, Indian municipalities, and the administrative jurisdictions – are built on existing altepetl and adapted to their form.5 Nahua civilization does not survive unchanged, then, but neither does the Spanish. Instead along with urban structures and administrative practices, music, language, and other cultural forms are progressively mixed, flowing through innumerable paths across the Atlantic in both directions, transforming both sides.6 Well before the formation of the United States, to give another, more directly political example, the Iroquois developed a federalist system to manage the relations among six nations – Mohawks, Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas, Tuscaroras, and Senecas – with checks and balances, separation between military and civil authorities, and other features later included in the U.S. Constitution. Iroquois federalism was widely discussed and admired in the eighteenth-century United States among figures such as Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson. The material aid of Native Americans to European settlers – how to plant crops, survive harsh winters, and so forth – has been incorporated into national mythology, but U.S. political forms are usually presented as being of purely European origin.7 The point of such examples is simply to demonstrate the mixture and mutual transformation that characterize the encounters of modernity. The problem with these examples, however, is that they do not emphasize the violence and unequal power relation of modernity. The dominant forces of modernity encounter not mere differences but resistances. What colonial historiography primarily accomplished and what needs to be countered, as Ranajit Guha explains, “is a conjuring trick to make resistance disappear from the political history of India under British rule.”8 There is something psychotic about the idea that modernity is a purely European invention, since it constantly has to deny the role in the construction and functioning of modernity of the rest of the world, especially those parts of it subordinated to European domination. Rather than a kind of psychic repression, we might better think of this denial as an instance of foreclosure in the psychoanalytical sense. Whereas the repressed element or idea, psychoanalysts explain, is buried deep inside, the foreclosed is expelled outside, so that the ego can act as if the idea never occurred to it at all. Therefore whereas when the repressed returns to the neurotic subject it rises up from the inside, the foreclosed is experienced by the psychotic as a threat from the outside. The foreclosed element in this case is not only the history of contributions to modern culture and society by non-European peoples and civilizations, making it seem that Europe is the source of all modern innovation, but also and more important the innumerable resistances within and against modernity, which constitute the primary element of danger for its dominant self-conception. Despite all the furious energy expended to cast out the “antimodern” other, resistance remains within.9 To insist that forces of antimodernity are within modernity, on the common terrain of encounter, is not to say, of course, that the modern world is homogeneous. Geographers rightly complain that, despite constant talk about space, contemporary theoretical discussions of postcoloniality and globalization generally present spaces that are anemic, devoid of real differences.10 The center-periphery model is one framework that does capture well in spatial terms the two-ness of modernity’s power relation, since the dominant center and subordinated peripheries exist only in relation to each other, and the periphery is systematically “underdeveloped” to fit the needs of the center’s development.11 Such geographies of modernity go awry, however, when they conceive resistance as external to domination. All too often Europe or “the West” is cast as homogenous and unified, as the pole of domination in this relationship, rendering invisible the long history of European liberation struggles and class struggles.12 And correspondingly many analyses neglect the forms of domination and control located outside Europe, conceiving them merely as echoes of European domination. This error cannot be corrected simply by multiplying the centers and peripheries – finding centers and peripheries within Europe, for instance, as well as within each subordinated country. To understand modernity, we have to stop assuming that domination and resistance are external to each other, casting antimodernity to the outside, and recognize that resistances mark differences that are within. The resulting geographies are more complex than simply the city versus the country or Europe versus its outside or the global North versus the global South. One final consequence of defining modernity as a power relation is to undermine any notion of modernity as an unfinished project. If modernity were thought to be a force purely against barbarism and irrationality, then striving to complete modernity could be seen as a necessarily progressive process, a notion shared by Jürgen Habermas and the other social democratic theorists we discussed earlier.13 When we understand modernity as a power relation, however, completing modernity is merely continuing the same, reproducing domination. More modernity or a more complete modernity is not an answer to our problems. On the contrary! For the first indications of an alternative, we should instead investigate the forces of antimodernity, that is resistances internal to modern domination.